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Alastair Bissett-Johnson* "Whatever Happened to
Exempt Property?" An
Overview of the Matrimonial
Property Act of Nova Scotia
I. Philosophy of the Act
As it is five years since the introduction of the Matrimonial
Property Act, it may be appropriate before turning to the title
of my paper to outline the general philosophy of the Act. The
philosophy is to allow either spouse to apply to the court on
the occurrence of one of the four triggering events (death,
divorce, nullity or separation) to seek an equal division of the
matrimonial assets. Where a merely equal division of
matrimonial assets would be unfair or unconscionable a court
may divide the matrimonial assets up unequally or have recourse
to the exempt property.
It is essential to realise that the time when the non-owning
spouse's interest arises (apart from special provisions affecting
the matrimonial home) is the time when the court makes its
order pursuant to ss. 12 and 13. This emerges from the recent
decision in Maroukis v. Maroukis.1 In that case, a wife had
sought division of a matrimonial home in 1978, but, before
the case reached trial, a bank obtained a defaultjudgment against
the husband in 1979 and filed an execution with the judgment.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had no
authority to vest an interest in the wife free of the execution
creditor's claims. The wife's right required the making of a court
order.
In other circumstances the courts have been wary of collusive
actions between spouses in a "happy marriage" especially under
ss. 16 and 18 which are independent of the triggering events
in s. 12. The effect of such actions could be to prejudice creditors
of the husband and therefore in Bray v. Bray2 an execution
creditor was permitted to be added as a party to an action
between the spouses. However, creditors of a non-owning spouse
*Professor of Law, Dalhousie University. This article was first presented at
the Family Law Conference organised by the Continuing Legal Education
Society of Nova Scotia on April 27th 1985.
1. (1981), 24 R.F.L., (2d) 113 (Ont. C.A. affirmed by Supreme Court of
Canada 54 N.R. 268.
2. (1979), 9 C.P.C. 241 (Ont. H.C.).
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(usually a wife) cannot force a debtor spouse into a s. 12
application merely to divest the owning spouse (usually a
husband) of assets for their benefit.
3
It is also clear that s. 12(l)(d) can only be invoked by a
surviving spouse to sue the estate of a deceased spouse and
not by the estate of a deceased spouse suing the surviving spouse
so as to obtain a fair share of the matrimonial assets.
4
II. Special Provisions Affecting the Matrimonial Home
A non-owning spouse is not given a proprietary interest in the
matrimonial home by the Act. Instead, s. 6 gives the non-owning
spouse a personal right of occupation, the same right of
occupation as the owning spouse. Thus, if the owning spouse's
rights of occupation are lost to creditors, so are those of the
non-owning spouse. 5 The effect of s. 6 where the owning spouse
loses his rights of occupation by death is obscure and shows
the problems of copying the Ontario Act where death is not
a triggering event.
The basic protection for a non-owning spouse's possessory
rights in the home conferred by s. 6 is the restriction on the
ability of the owning spouse to make a disposition affecting
the home or to encumber it without the non-owning spouse's
consent, release in a marriage contract or separation agreement,
or a court order. Section 8 has a number of critical features.
First, the rights of the spouse arise when the spouses marry
and use the house as a matrimonial home. They cannot by
marrying and moving into an already encumbered home give
themselves retrospective priority over existing mortgagees as
was sought to be done in Sherwood v. Sherwood.6 Second,
a non-owning spouse may be overridden where the owning
spouse gives a false affidavit to a purchaser or mortgages under
s. 8(3). In Stoimenov v. Stoimenov7 the mortgagee took free
of the wife's rights and was able to rely on the husband's false
affidavit that he was unmarried because he had no actual notice
to the contrary. 8 The decision has recently been overturned on
3. See Deloitte, Haskins & Sells v. Graham (1983), 32 R.F.L. (2d) 356 (Alta.
Q. B.).
4. Sagar v. Bradley (1984), 63 N.S.R. (2d) 386 (A.D.).
5. Re Mauro, (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 157 (H.C.).
6. (1982), 29 R.F.L. (2d) 374 (T.D.).
7. (1982), 40 O.R. (2d) 69 (H.C.).
8. The Nova Scotia Act merely talks of notice.
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appeal. 9 Apparently the mortgagee, following its usual practice,
had obtained a Toronto Credit Bureau check which showed
a husband and wife living at the house, and the filing of a
non-responsibility notice by Mr. Stoimenov in 1978. However,
this information and the discrepancy between it and the
husband's representing himself as being "single" on the mortgage
application form was never passed on to its solicitor. Moreover,
the solicitor had done a title search in 1976 which showed that
there was a transfer from the Stoimenovs as joint tenants to
the husband alone. All of this should have revealed the necessity
for Mrs. Stoimenov to consent to the encumbrance. The effect
of the decision on real estate practice is profound and requires
mortgagees and others to take into account any information
they may possess which conflicts with the affidavit's contents,
and not merely to rely pro forma on the affidavit alone for
their protection. Tarnopolsky, J.A. held that the words in s.
42(3) of the Ontario Act 0 do not relate to whether the mortgagee
had 'notice to the contrary that the property was a matrimonial
home'. Rather the words 'to the contrary' relate to any of the
items relevant to s. 43(a) to (d)."I
The practical effect of the decision may be to force the
computerisation of Law Offices and Trust Companies so that
they can cross reference all information coming to them in a
series of apparently unrelated transactions. Also unresolved is
the question of client confidentiality, e.g., when a solicitor
learns of the husband's marital status when acting for him in
on one transaction and then later acts for the mortgagee in
another apparently non-contentious transaction and comes
across an apparently inaccurate affidavit. Whilst the full import
of this decision is still to emerge, at least one step may need
to be taken by the Bar. Solicitor's certifying title to purchasers
or mortgagees may wish to exempt themselves from
responsibility for information in the personal knowledge of
their clients which has not been passed on to them.
As to what constitutes a disposition of encumbrance we now
9. See Ontario Lawyers Weekly, March 15th, 1985 (O.L.W. full text 419-
021.)
10. Ss. 8(2) & (3) in Nova Scotia.
11. Ss. 8(a) to (c) in Nova Scotia, i.e., (a) that the transferor is not a spouse,
(b) that he is but the property has never been occupied as a matrimonial
home or (c) that the other spouse's rights in the property have been released
in separation agreement, marriage contract, etc.
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know that a lease by a wife without her husband's permission
is a disposition liable to be set aside.' 2 More importantly the
attempt in Mills v. Andrewes 3 by a mother to sever a joint
tenancy into a tenancy in common so that she could leave
something to her child by a previous marriage was held to
infringe s. 8. The result is sad in that the mother was unable
to leave anything to her son despite having contributed to the
purchase of the home and its furnishings. Nor could her estate
sue as plaintiff for an equal share of the matrimonial assets.
Actions for equal division under s. 12(l)(d) seem to be restricted
to actions by a living plaintiff against the deceased spouse's
estate.' 4 If the property had been in the husband's and wife's
names as tenants in common it is uncertain whether the wife's
leaving her share in the home to her son in her will might
still not be a disposition within s. 8. That this is even arguable
shows the problem of copying the Ontario legislation's wording
in Nova Scotia whilst at the same time making death a
triggering event.
Two final points are worth noting in connection with homes.
Although s. 3(1) of the Act appears to exclude leasehold
property from the definition of matrimonial home, this needs
qualification in the light of Beaman v. Beaman.'5 In that case
Burchell J. held that the effect of a lease/purchase scheme
operated by the Department of Housing was to create a
property right taking the arrangement outside the range of
ordinary leases. This holding that the lease/purchase home was
a matrimonial asset was without prejudice to the contractual
rights of the Department of Housing.
When drafting marriage or separation agreements between
spouses relating to the home it may be important to make clear
whether a spouse is merely putting legal title in the wife (e.g.
putting it beyond the reach of his creditors) 6 or whether he
is relinquishing his s. 12 rights which are notwithstanding the
ownership of the assets. Finally if a wife is taking a conveyance
12. Flynn v. Graves oral decision of Macintosh J. not yet reported. The
tenants have been given time to find suitable alternative accommodation.
13. (1982), 31 R.F.L. (2d) 47 (N.S.S.C., T.D.). This may be contrasted with
the Ontario decision in Larnanna v. Lamanna, (1983), 32 R.F.L. (2d) 386
(Ont. H.C.) though that decision seems unlikely to have survived after Kozub
v. Timko, (1984), 39 R.F.L. (2d) 146 (Ont. C.A.).
14. Sagar v. Bradley (1984), 63 N.S.R. (2d) 386 (A.D.).
15. 62 N.S.R. (2d) 351 (T.D.).
16. See, supra, note 3.
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from her husband when she is currently a joint tenant with
him but she wishes to retain the right to sue him on the deed
(e.g. for a defect in title), it may be better for the wife not
to join in the conveyance to herself under a warranty deed.
1 7
III. The Matrimonial Assets! Exempted Assets Boundary
Central to the scheme of the Matrimonial Property Act is the
distinction between matrimonial property and exempt property.
Matrimonial property is primafacie shareable equally, exempt
property is only available for sharing in a reserve capacity.
Since the last Family Law Conference in 1980 a number of
cases have continued the trend established in Lawrence v.
Lawrence18 that matrimonial property is to be construed
broadly and excluded property narrowly so that one may
legitimately wonder what is left of the latter except as an
"endangered species". This may also put into perspective the
decision in MacGregor v. MacGregor9 where Hallet J. pointed
out that wives' rights under the Matrimonial Property Acts
were not necessarily greater than under the old practice of using
the secured lump sum maintenance powers under the Divorce
Act as a device for achieving divisions of matrimonial assets.
The whole question of whether, since the decision in Hemming
v. Hemming,20 there has been reluctance to award lump sum
maintenance to "top up" the division of assets under the
Matrimonial Property Act was the subject of special attention
by Walter Goodfellow in the Conference Proceedings in the
1985 CLE Update on Family Law Conference. However it is
obvious that where matrimonial assets are broadly interpreted
an equal (or unequal) division of such assets may leave less
property in a husband's hands out of which to pay lump sum
maintenance.
1. Property Prima Facie Excluded From Equal Division
(a) The leased matrimonial home s. 3(1) (note that the lease/
purchase home in Beaman v. Beaman2' was held to be a
matrimonial asset).
17. Thistle v. Thistle, 42 N.S.R. (2d) 430 at 441 para. 30 (T.D.).
18. (1981), 25 R.F.L. (2d) 130 (N.S.S.C., A.D.).
19. 65 N.S.R. (2d) 113 (T.D.).
20. 58 N.S.R. (2d) 65 (A.D.).
21. See, supra, note 11.
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(b) Gifts. Gifts from third parties are presumptively excluded
from sharing under s. 4(l)(2) unless used for the benefit of
both spouses or their children. In Roquet v. Roquet22 a husband
was given a Guaranteed-Investment Certificate by his relations.
The moneys for the gift in turn represented funds from the
husband's grandmother's estate. The grandmother scarcely
knew the wife but had designated the husband as her favourite
grandson. At one stage the husband had indicated that the
funds might be used as a down payment of a matrimonial home
but they had not been so used. Glube C.J. held that the funds
were a matrimonial asset. This seems to confuse the intention
of the donee husband with the intention of the donor and
ignores the fact that the necessary act to perfect the gift to
the wife, namely putting the Guaranteed Investment Certificate
into the joint names of the spouses, had never taken place.
(c) Business assets. Two recent cases confirm the view that
business assets which are presumptively excluded from sharing
under s. 4(l)(f) are being narrowly interpreted whilst
matrimonial assets are being broadly interpreted. In Best v.
Best23 Hallett, J. treated a farm, which had never produced
profits, although it had been granted certain tax benefits
available to bona fide farms, as a matrimonial rather than a
business asset. The lack of profits was not conclusive but it
was a factor in the classification. There may be dangers in
depicting a farm as operating at either a loss or minimum profit
in order to obtain certain tax advantages should the spouses
marriage ever fail. It may also be relevant that the farm had
also been acquired as a good place in which to raise a family.
In Gaetz v. Gaetz24 Glube C.J. treated a duplex property
in joint names as a matrimonial asset. This seems strange in
so far as the unit in which the parties did not live is concerned.
This would probably best be regarded as a jointly owned
business asset subject to the terms of the joint tenancy. A second
property containing six units was owned in the wife's name
but was managed and maintained by the husband. In view of
22. N.S.T.D. No. 1201-27504, 19th Dec. 1983, unreported.
23. 61 N.S.R. (2d) 400 (T.D.). On the relevance of the lack of profit compare
the case with Wilson v. Wilson (1984), 66 N.S.R. (2d) 361 (T.D.) where Glube
C. J. treated as a set of 4 flats which had never made a profit as a "business
asset".
24. Unreported 10 N.S.L.N. 65 1201-27410.
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the husband's signing a full release in respect of this property
one might have expected this to have disposed of any argument
made by him based on a resulting or constructive trust.
However, Glube, C.J.T.D. seems to have felt that since this
investment property was intended as a retirement investment
for the parties it was a matrimonial asset by analogy with a
pension. "Had the money not been used there it would have
formed part of the household or matrimonial funds." With
respect, this argument means that virtually no asset is ever likely
to be held to be a business asset. Either it will become too
onerous to manage, as with a family company, and will be
sold and the proceeds used to live off, or it will be sold in
any event to finance the parties retirement, since few people's
pensions will support them at the standard of living to which
they have become accustomed during their working life.
(dv) Property acquired since separation. The boundary line
between an increase in existing matrimonial assets which are
shareable even in respect of increases in value after separation
and new property acquired for the first time which is
presumptively exempt from sharing under s. 4(l)(g) is fuzzy.
As the discussion of pensions later shows, a pension is difficult
to value as it may have a value to the husband (as it usually
is) greatly in excess of its after tax cash surrender value. Whilst
a pension is usually a matrimonial asset, are increases in value
arising after separation but due to the husband's and his
employers contributions still matrimonial assets? The item
concerned is not discrete and separate as would be payments
into separate R.R.S.P.'s made before and after separation.
IV. Pensions and How to Value Them
1. Treatment of Pensions in Other Provinces
Except for Ontario, the approach either by statute25 or by case
law26 has been to treat occupational pensions as shareable
assets. Even in Ontario, the recent decision in Laflamme v.
Laflamme27 has indicated that an occupational pension can be
taken into account by courts under their reserve powers relating
25. E.g. Manitoba Act, s. 8.1.
26. In B.C. see Rutherfordv. Rutherford, (1981), 23 R. F.L. (2d) 337 (B.C.C.A.)
and the cases in nn. 24 and 25 in Saskatchewan.
27. (1984), 40 R.F.L. (2d) 366 (Ont. H.C.).
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to unequal division. When it comes to valuing pensions in other
provinces the approach generally seems to be one of giving
wives a share in their husband's pension but postponing the
wife's right to collect her share until the earliest date at which
the husband can retire. By this stage the various contingencies
mentioned later will have resolved themselves. If the husband
continues to work after he has a right to a pension he must
compensate his wife. Alternatively if the husband wishes to buy
out the wife's right to his pension earlier, he may be given
this option. This desire by courts for a "clean break" is a feature
of Fisher v. Fisher2 8 and the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal's
substitution in Tataryn29 of a lump sum payment of $25,000
in lieu of sharing the pension payments in the future between
husband and wife. Before the appropriate lump sum can be
calculated it is important that accurate evidence of the
contingencies and assumptions made in the actuarial
calculations be led. 30 Production of such evidence is likely to
be expensive. In simple terms 3' calculation of the respective
interests in the pension is done by finding what was the
proportion of the years payment to the pension made during
cohabitation to the total years of payment to the plan to acquire
the pension.
e.g. 20 years of marriage
He has 40 years of pension service = pension accrued
during marriage - 2
Thus the wife gets a quarter of the pension. An alternative
28. (1983), 21 Sask. R. 235 (Q.B.).
29. (1984), 30 Sask. R. 282 (C.A.).
30. As the Court of Appeal observed in Tatarvn v. Tataryn, Ibid. at p. 295,
[I]t is not enough to have the evidence, alone, of the administrator of
the pension plan (or someone else fully conversant with the scheme); his
evidence is critical, but there must be more. Several sub-issues have to
be addressed: life expectancy; pensionable age expectancy; continued
employment expectancy; the prospects for the employer, including the
provisions, if any, which have been made for the protection of the employer's
(sic] pension in the event of the insolvency of the employer; present value,
of the principal pension, as well as any death benefits; the ramifications
of any other options available under the plan; tax implications; and the
like. Otherwise it is difficult, if not impossible, to make the distribution
contemplated by the Act.
31. For more detail see Maclise and Stark's analysis of Rutherford in A.
Bissett-Johnson & Holland, Matrimonial Property Law in Canada (Calgary:
Burroughs, 1980) at 19 et seq.
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approach is to value the employee contributions to the plan
during cohabitation plus an estimated rate of interest. 32 In many
cases, however, there is no very direct relationship between the
amount of contributions and the amount of benefits payable.
33
Equally, statutory provisions 34 may preclude the sale or pledge
of pension rights so as to make a market value of such rights
impossible and it may not be clear whether the spouse has
enough years of pensionable employment to have a "vested"
right to the pension at the time of marital breakdown.
In order to deal with contingencies such as (i) whether the
husband's right to his employers contributions will 'vest', (ii)
whether he will survive to retirement age, the element of
guesswork can be taken out of the calculation by conferring
current rights on the wife in her husband's pension but
postponing the right to collection until the earliest date at which
the husband can retire has been reached. By this time the
various contingencies will have resolved themselves, though if
the husband elected not to retire he has to compensate his
wife. 35 This, however, as has been mentioned, is in some cases
in conflict with the desire of the courts and, no doubt, the
parties, to have a "clean break" at the time of divorce so that
the parties can go their separate ways after divorce.
2. In Nova Scotia
Initially in Ryan v. Ryan,36 Hallett, J. wondered whether
contractual rights under a pension were within the definition
of property as a matrimonial asset within the Act. However,
this argument is no longer tenable after the decision in
Lawrence v. Lawrence and the traditional definition of property
rights may have been overtaken by the concept of the 'new
32. See Boychuk v. Boychuk (1981), 9 Sask R. 82 (Q.B.); Kaine v. Kaine
(1983), 30 Sask R. 23 (Q.B.).
33. See Tentative Proposals for Reform of the Matrimonial Property Act
Saskatchewan Law Reform Commission Sept. 1984, p. 62.
34. E.g. see the Saskatchewan Pension Benefits Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-6 s.
19, though the rules would not catch a court order or an agreement made
by the spouses under the Matrimonial Property Acts.
35. See for example Rutherford v. Rutherford supra at note 26, Re Fisher
(1982), 31 R.F.L. (2d) 274 (Sask. Q.B.); Tataryn v. Tataryn (1982), 27 R.F.L.
(2d) 283 (Sask. Q.B.); Topliss v. Topliss (1983), 23 Sask. R. 289 (Q.B.).
36. (1981), 43 N.S.R. (2d) 423 at 435.
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property'. 37 Lawrence acknowledged the problem of valuing
assets but shed no light on how to go about it. Several
approaches are possible and each has underlying assumptions
and has problems associated with it.
a) Cash on the table. Under this approach, usually only
appropriate where both the employer's and employee's
contributions have vested and can be withdrawn from the fund,
the moneys can be divided between the husband and the wife.
Of course, if the effect of the totality of the court's orders,
including those for lump sum maintenance, is to force the
withdrawal of pension funds then a tax obligation occurs. The
failure of the Court of Appeal in Lawrence v. Lawrence to
recognize this left the husband with a negative net worth.
b) Capitalised value. In some cases, e.g. Bedgood v. Bedgood38
the argument has been made that the value to the husband
of his future pension far exceeds its cash surrender value.
Counsel will argue that in order to produce (on reducing fund
basis) an income equal to 70% of the husband's best three or
five years earnings a huge capital sum would be necessary. 39
Various assumptions have to go into such a calculation
involving (i) that the employer will stay in business, 40 (ii) that
the employee will remain in his present employment until
retirement age, and (iii) that he will survive to retirement age.
Given those assumptions, it will not be difficult to produce
a capitalised value of the pension well in excess of $250,000
and to make an agreement that the wife is entitled to the
matrimonial home outright and perhaps other assets. Such a
division would, however, leave the husband asset poor in terms
of available current assets and the wife would be current asset
rich. Moreover, it assumes a number of things which may not
necessarily occur. Giving the wife a present right in her
husband's pension, is complex, contrary to the 'clean break'
theory and raises questions of how this can legally be done
under the court's powers under s. 15.
37. Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1981).
38. (1982), 28 R.F.L. (2d) 113 (N.S.S.C., A.D.).
39. Many of the best payments into the fund will result from contributions
made after separation. Are these matrimonial assets within s. 4 (g)?
40. The risk is presumably lower in the public sector - see Mosher v. Mosher
unreported, 1201-29048, judgment given December 27, 1984.
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c) A factor to be taken into account in making unequal division.
There is no denying that the security of the occupation pension
leaves a husband in most cases with a better financial future
than his wife. Another approach is to take the pension into
account as a factor which might lead to an unequal division
of the matrimonial assets, 41 or, less convincingly, in making
an award of maintenance. 42 This may well have been in the
mind of Hallett, J. when he stated in Mosher v. Mosher:
4 3
A pension is worth very much more in reality than any
amount that could be obtained by a contributor withdrawing
his contributions even if he could withdraw the whole
amount. In a sense to talk of his having an asset that has
a dollar figure the equivalent to what he could withdraw
is rather illusionary because it is fairly obvious in cases such
as this it would be unthinkable for Mr. Mosher to withdraw
his contributions even if he could withdraw all of them or
to the extent that he could.
Before discussing this statement further it is important to
place the comments in context. Mr. Mosher was in the Fire
Service and was about 45. He had a senior position and seemed
unlikely to change his job or to lose it. His pension
contributions plus interest were worth $24,250.00 and he could
take those if he ever left the Fire Service except for those made
after January 1, 1977, which were required to be held back
under s. 22 of the Nova Scotia Pensions Benefits Act. The
position with regard to the employee's contributions is not dis-
closed. Mr. Justice Hallett decided that although the pension
was a matrimonial asset he ought not to put a firm value on
the pension but it should be regarded as a factor to be looked
at in the division of assets. One wonders, however, if a 'balance
sheet approach' does not require some attempt (however
speculative) to put a value on the pension. It is also true that
in the Mosher case that the down payment on the home, a
number of improvements and the car were paid by Mrs. Mosher
from gifts and inheritances and that a case of unequal division
was established. The unequal division ordered by Hallett J.
left the wife with the equity in the home worth $63,000 less
41. Conrad v. Conrad (1983), 34 R. F. L. (2d) 348 (N. S. S.C., T D.).
42. This approach taken in some earlier Saskatchewan cases was criticised
by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Tataryn v. Tataryn (1984), 30 Sask.
R. 282 (C.A.).
43. Unreported, 1201-29408,judgment given December 27, 1984.
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an 8% mortgage in favour of the husband worth $10,000
redeemable three years later, plus R.R.S.P.'s and furnishings,
etc., worth approximately $8,000. The husband kept the car
subject to a loan (probably almost equal to its value), the
mortgage and his pension and occupational life insurance.
Hallett J. stated that while the division appeared very much
in the wife's favour this was not so much so on closer scrutiny.
In I 1 years time at age 56 Mr. Mosher would have the chance
of early retirement or, if he continued to work until mandatory
retirement at 60, he would have his pension based on 70% of
the average of his last 5 year's salary. Herein lies the problem.
Even if the pension entitlement arising during marriage is a
matrimonial asset, much of the husband's pension value will
be attributable to his last 15 years service and contributions
which are post separation. This is so even admitting that there
is a very precise relationship between contributions into a
pension scheme and entitlements. On the other hand the wife's
loss of a spouse's entitlement in her husband's pension under
s. 13(1) is a factor that the court can legitimately take into
account in ordering an unequal division of assets. However,
if a wife is able to build up any occupational pension
entitlement as a result of contributions made after separation
arising from the employment these would not be shareable. 44
Conclusions
It is submitted that an effort should be made to put some sort
of present cash value on the pension entitlement. It may be
more appropriate to follow the example of Hallett, J. in
MacGregor v. MacGregor45 and Nunn J. in Tkach v. Tkach46
and value the amount as the cash surrender value less the tax
payable on withdrawal. It does seem that something like a
pension can only be properly taken into account under s. 13
if some attempt has been made to gauge its size. It is submitted
44. This factor was not likely in Mosher owing to Mrs. Mosher's health.
45. (1984), 65 N.S.R. (2d) 113.
46. Tkach v. Tkach (N.S.S.C.) unreported decision October 15th, 1984; see
also Devenney v. Devenney f.n. 74 post where the after tax values attaching
to the pension involved a discount of 35% as a contingent tax deduction.
The respondent who benefitted from the discount did not dispute that
approach. See also Olexson v. Olexson (1983), 32 R.F.L. (2d) 408 (Sask.
U.F.C.).
800 The Dalhousie Law Journal
that the present vesting in a wife of rights in her husband's
pension but postponing her right to collect is both unduly
complex and contrary to the 'clean break' principle. Moreover
McLeod 47 cautions against courts (a) giving a wife a share in
a pension and (b) making an order for a wife's maintenance
extending beyond the husband's retirement date. Upon
retirement the husband's income will be dependent on his
pension and if the wife has already been awarded an interest
in it as a capital asset, should she also be able to obtain an
interest in it as an ongoing maintenance obligation?
Finally, in passing, it will be noted that although Canada
Pension Plan payments can be split on divorce, a recent case
suggests that this cannot be done if the parties have apparently
reached a full settlement of matrimonial property matters which
does not except the Canadian Pension rights from its
application. 48 However, the C.P.P. rights really only operate
well for a wife where the couple marry at 18 and divorce at
age 65 less one day. The split only divides payments made
during the marriage.
4 9
V. Occupation of the Family Home and the Husband's Equity
in it
Prior to the Matrimonial Property Act, it was not uncommon
for the husband to be deprived of all interest in the home by
the device 50 of lump sum maintenance under the Divorce Act. 5'
More recently the Courts have shown a willingness to give the
wife the matrimonial home in such a way as not to totally
deprive the husband of his equity.52 The arithmetic in some
of these cases shows that the generosity of the court's award
is less apparent on close scrutiny. In MacGregor v.
47. See McLeod's annotation to (1980), 18 R.F.L. (2d).
48. See Preece et al. v. Minister of National Health & Welfare C.C.H.
Employment & Benefits Guide, para. 8, 914.
49. For more detail see Patricia Horsford,Division of Canada Pension Plan
Credits on Termination of Marriage(1980), 13 R.F.L. (2d) 257.
50. MacKeigan C.J.'s own words in Connelly v. Connelly (1974), 16 R.F.L.
171 (N.S.S.C., A.D.).
51. See for example Swift v. Swift 1201-17257 24th July 1979 unreported.
52. See for example Currie v. Currie, (1981), 21 R.F.L. (2d) 340 (N.S.S.C.,
T.D.); Partridge v. Partridge N.S.L.N. 7:568; Ryan v. Ryan (1980), 43 N.S.R.
(2d) 423 (T.D.).
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MacGregor53 the husband was ordered to transfer his share
in the matrimonial home to his wife (approximately $55,000)
in return for his wife giving him a mortgage on it in the sum
of $47,000. This mortgage was not to be redeemable until 1989
and to carry no interest. (The fact that any interest paid by
the wife to the husband would be regarded as taxable income
may explain the judge's decision) One might speculate that,
assuming a 10% increase in property at compound rates, the
wife's home in 1989 would be worth in excess of $175,000.
If the purchase power of the dollar goes down by 5% (a modest
rate of inflation judged by recent years) the husband's
purchasing power in 1989 would be about $35,000 in 1984
dollars. Still, something is better than nothing!
On the question of the appropriate rate of interest where
the wife is ordered to execute a mortgage on the matrimonial
home, the Court of Appeal in Nolet v. Nolet54 held that the
trial judge's formula of the prime rate as set by the Bank of
Canada plus 1% might be appropriate. In the instant case, the
rate was changed to 7% p.a. simple interest with no payment
of principal or interest to become due until the mortgage
matured.
VI. Matrimonial Debts
Although the Act makes no distinction between matrimonial
and other debts and although s. 13 does not provide expressly
for the division, Hart J.A. had stated in Lawrence v. Lawrence55
that:
If substantial debts were borne by one spouse for the benefit
of the whole family it would be unfair to divide assets without
providing for the obligations of the matrimonial unit.
It is presumably a combination of this philosophy and s.
13(b) "the amount of the debts and liabilities of each spouse
and the circumstances in which they were incurred" that leads
to the use of the equity in the matrimonial home rather than
market value as the basis of valuation.
Apart from Lawrence, the case which has given the most
53. (1985), 65 N.S.R. (2d) 113.
54. S.C.A. 01447 judgment given 3rd, July, 1985.
55. (1981), 47 N.S.R. (2d) 100 at 115.
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attention to matrimonial debts is the recent decision of Hallett,
J. in Arthur v. Arthur.56 Hallet J. ordered an unequal division
of the matrimonial assets ($39,000 resulting from the sale of
the matrimonial home) because the husband incurred a number
of debts by taking money out of his business in an attempt
to prevent a judgment being obtained against the husband's
part of the joint interest in the matrimonial home. The reduced
income of the family arising from the rearranged family and
business financial affairs had led to a number of debts
accumulating in respect of family expenses, oil bills, Chargex,
etc. In addition after separation the wife incurred debts of
$3,600 in an attempt to provide for her children and her need
to upgrade her education if she was to support them.
Hallett J.'s approach was not automatically to deduct
matrimonial debts from the matrimonial assets on a dollar for
dollar basis. Rather it was a factor that a court could take
into consideration in the exercise of its discretion under s. 13.
The husband's allowing debts to accumulate without cause or
having taken over debts, e.g. mortgage repayments in lieu of
maintenance would not necessarily warrant the court's
discretion being exercised in his favour. Moreover as a general
rule:
Ordinary household debts such as Chargex, Simpsons,
Eatons, Canadian Tire, etc., incurred for necessaries for the
family are paid by the husband in the so-called "traditional
marriage" where the husband works and the wife stays at
home. It would not be unfair that he continue to be
responsible for these debts after separation. Where both
spouses work, as a general rule there should probably be
a sharing of ordinary household bills outstanding at the date
of separation. Each case must be decided on its own facts
considering the circumstances that gave rise to the debts or
liabilities of the respective spouses.
What of debts incurred after separation? Generally speaking,
these debts should not be considered in determining if it
would be unfair to simply divide assets equally. However,
there are exceptions. For example, if the spouse having
custody of the children while awaiting the hearing of the
divorce proceedings (including an application for division of
property under the Matrimonial Property Act) was not
receiving adequate maintenance from the non-custodial
56. (1985), 67 N.S.R. (2d) 323 (T.D.).
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spouse and had to borrow funds or incur debts to maintain
the children, then it would seem obvious that it would be
unfair to ignore this factor.
The underlying test is (a) fairness and (b) asking whether
the debts were ordinary ones. This would enable a court to
consider a possible difference between debts arising from the
running expenses of the household, and debts arising from
occasional expenditures to buy capital items, e.g. expensive
appliances to be paid for over an extended period of time. 57
In the light of this approach to matrimonial and other debts
Hallett J. deducted certain debts in the sum of $10,000 from
the $39,000 proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home. The
balance of $29,000 was split equally between the parties.
VII. Tracing
The problem sometimes arises about assets that have changed
their classification from business assets to matrimonial assets
or vice versa. In Bregman v. Bregman,58 the Ontario Courts
were willing to treat as a family asset a Picasso painting brought
home from the husband's office prior to the breakdown of the
marriage. It is less clear what they would have done if the
transfer had been from the home to the office, though logically
the classification of an asset should be made at the time of
proceedings. In MacGregor v. MacGregor,59 Hallett, J. dealt
with a situation in which the husband acquired a 25% interest
in a company incorporated to acquire a few small apartment
buildings. To fund his contribution of $7,000, he used an
inheritance of $5,300 plus $1,700 from a joint bank account.
At a later date, he advanced a further $600 from the spouses
joint account. as matrimonial assets and traced it into the
company giving the wife a 7.5% share in the company. The
company was classified as a matrimonial asset. The result is
not unreasonable but it is suggested a more reasonable
approach would be to treat the company as a business asset
and, as the wife's funds had been used to purchase a business
asset, she should have a corresponding share in the company
57. This is an elaboration of Hallett J.'s reasoning but seems consistent both
with his reasoning and that part of cotinsel's argument incorporated in his
judgment.
58. (1979), 7 R.F.L. (2d) 201 affirmed on costs 25 O.R. (2d) 254n.
59. Supra, note 45.
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as her business asset. In passing I should note that whether
property purchased with funds drawn from a joint account
belongs to the spouse in whose name legal title is taken or
to both spouses depends on the intention of the spouses in
relation to the joint account. 60 Even if, on this analysis, the
husband were taken to be the sole legal owner of a busness
asset it would not preclude the court from invoking its discre-
tion under s. 13 to redress any unfairness.
VIII. Involving a Spouse in the Other Spouse's Business
Equity presumed that if one person transferred property into
the name of another person without there being other evidence
that a gift was intended, the donor held the legal title only
and the donor held the equitable title under the doctrine of
the resulting trust. However, by way of exception to the general
rule a gift was inferred if the donor was a husband or father
and the donee was a wife or child. (Gifts were not presumed
from wives to husbands!) However this presumption of
advancement has been revoked in most provinces6' with the
result that a husband may retain an interest in property in his
wife's name. But this does not mean that giving a wife shares
in her husband's business is necessarily desirable. Even putting
qualification shares in the wife's name, a practice legally
required in few provinces, may be risky. Putting shares in a
wife's name (as it usually is) is best reserved for those cases
where the non-owning spouse is actively contributing to the
business. In such a case either an appropriately worded
marriage contract or buy sell agreement should be signed at
the time of making the allocation of shares.
The wife has no automatic right to share in her husband's
business assets and by putting shares or other business assets
in her name may limit the husband's rights to retain such assets.
It is true that in most provinces the old presumption of
advancement of gift from husband to a wife has been replaced
by the presumption of a resulting trust but this does not mean
that other evidence of an intention to make a gift may not
60. Compare Jones v. Maynard, [1951] 1 Ch. 572 with Re Bishop, [1965]
1 Ch. 450. For a fuller discussion see D. Waters Law of Trusts in Canada
(2nd ed.) (Toronto, Carswells, 1984) p. 333 et seq.
61. Matrimonial Property Act, S.N.S. 1980, c.9, s.21.
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be available. Such evidence may exist in terms of statements
made at the time of transfer or even an admission during the
course of discovery prior to trial. It may be extremely difficult
for a husband to rely on the doctrine of the resulting trust.
In Miller v. Miller62 a husband transferred property into his
wife's name for purposes of tax planning but then sought to
invoke the doctrine of the resulting trust under s. 11 of the
Ontario Act. The Ontario Court of Appeal pointed out that
the tax planning would have been ineffective if the wife were
a mere trustee or nominee and there was, therefore, evidence
that a gift to the wife was intended. This reasoning was also
followed by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Mallia v.
Mallia.63 The husband's explanation for transferring property
into his wife's name ("I wanted my wife to have full enjoyment
of the lands as my wife ... I never though in my wildest
imagination that she was going to walk out of the door") was
clearly inconsistent with his having retained an interest in the
property in his wife's name.
It is true that in Moog v. Moog 64 Cromarty J. held that
a husband, who had registered all the shares in one of his
companies in the wife's name to provide the family with security
if the husband's other ventures failed, had only given it to her
as a trustee. Thus when the marriage broke down the husband
was entitled to require reconveyance of the shares by the wife
subject to $4,000,000 as compensation for the wife's
contribution to the husband's $61,000,000 of non-family assets.
However the question must be asked what would the husband's
intention in relation to the "wife's company" have been if the
marriage had not broken down but his other businesses had
gone bankrupt? If his wife was bare trustee for him, his trustee
in bankruptcy could have claimed the assets. Would that have
accorded with the husband's intention? Can he say "I intend
to transfer my shares to my wife outright if I go bankrupt
but only as trustee if the marriage goes wrong?"
Even if the wife has no shares in her husband's business and
takes no part in its operation it cannot be assumed a wife has
no claim on the business. Often in order to raise capital a
62. (1982), 29 R.F.L. (2d) 395 (Ont. C.A.).
63. (1983), 27 R.F.L. (2d) 318 (N.S.C.A.).
64. (1984), 37 R.F.L. (2d) 356 (Ont. H.C.).
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mortgage or collateral security will have to be given. Does the
fact of using a family asset as security for a husband's business
give the wife a claim on the business? In Dziedic v. Dziedic
65
the Ontario High Court held that by permitting the residence
to be mortgaged for business purposes, the wife contributed
money or money's worth to the company and was thereby
entitled to an interest in the company. Equally where a wife
contributes to a business by answering the phone, etc., it cannot
be assumed that the business has any value. Arthur v. Arthur
66
stated that the fruits of the wife's labours did not result in
the creation of a business asset of any value that could be
measured.
IX. Time for Valuation
In Roquet v. Roquet67 Chief Justice Glube held that assets
should be valued at the date of separation. Clearly it would
be helpful if form 67.03 of the Civil Procedure Rules contained
columns indicating the value of assets not merely at the time
of filing but also at the time of separation. Indeed it might
be convenient to have a blank column of values at trial so
that if a case takes time to come to court the court may "pencil
in" the current values at the stage to see whether recourse to
the increased value is appropriate under s. 13 or the principle
of disparity of net worth adverted to in Archibald v.
Archibald.68 It should be re-emphasized that the exempted
property in s. 4 includes property acquired after separation but
not necessarily an increase in the value of existing matrimonial
assets after separation. The latter may, however, be relevant
to the exercise of the courts discretion under s. 13.
X. Conduct
Ever since the Court of Appeal decision in Brown v. Brown
69
there has been an increased reliance on conduct as a factor
under s. 13 notwithstanding that conduct was no where
mentioned in the statute. In Briggs v. Briggs 70 Hallet J. said:
65. (1978), 6 R.F.L. (2d) 337 (Ont. H.C.).
66. (1985), 67 N.S.R. (2d) 323.
67. 1201-27504, Dec. 19th, 1983 unreported.
68. (1981), 48 N.S.R. (2d) 361 (T.D.). See also Mason v. Mason (1980),
42 N.S.R. (2d) 352 (T.D.) varied 47 N.S.R. (2d) 435 (A.D.).
69. (1983), 35 R.F.L. (2d) 390 (N.S.S.C., A.D.).
70. (1984), 64 N.S.R. (2d) 40 (T.D.).
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With respect to subsection (i) which provides "the
contribution made by each spouse to the marriage and to
the welfare of the family, including any contribution made
as a homemaker or parent", I am satisfied the contribution
referred to in that subsection is more than just a financial
contribution; I am satisfied this is implied from the preamble
to the Matrimonial Property Act. In this case, the respondent
walked away from his responsibility as a husband and a
father in January, 1983, after a period of several years during
which he was seeing his girl friend and, as a consequence,
paying less and less attention to his family.
It is respectfully submitted that the conduct of which Hallett
J. was talking was conduct that could be seen to have a casual
relationship to the matrimonial assets. In the subsequent case
of MacGregor v. MacGregor7' Hallet J. clarified the
significance of Briggs when he said that in Briggs the husband's
affair prior to separation had resulted in his contribution to
the family welfare being substantially below par. In MacGregor
there was no evidence that
the respondent's contribution to the welfare of the family
and the marriage was any less than that of the petitioner
as a result of the relationship with Mrs. Tyson. Therefore,
the respondent's conduct does not demand an unequal
division pursuant to s. 13 of the Matrimonial Property Act.
The view that the Matrimonial Property Act was not
intended to lead to long 3 day trials spent raking over the dirty
linen of the marriage is supported by Devenney v. Devenney. 72
Such irrelevant considerations may be relevant to the questions
of costs which are dealt with later in this paper. Burchell J.
stated:
My view is that Mr. Justice Cooper in Brown v. Brown did
not intend to import into the Matrimonial Property Act an
absolute concept of marital fault. Instead I think it must
be taken from his reference to Connelly v. Connelly that
any consideration of conduct under the Matrimonial
Property Act must be in accordance with modern precepts
concerning marital fault; that is to say, the precepts
expounded by Chief Justice MacKeigan in the Connelly
decision.
The present case is an example of the kind of abuse that
will result from any other approach. Seeking to reduce his
71. (1984), 65 N.S.R. (2d) 113 (T.D.).
72. (1985), 67 N.S.R. (2d) 444 (T.D.)
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wife's entitlement, the respondent has done his best to
blacken her character and has paraded before the court an
ugly array of unsubstantiated doubts and suspicions
stretching back to the earliest days of the marriage. Naturally
there was a response on her part and between them they
have continued, all to no purpose, a most unpleasant public
display of dirty laundry . . . . instances in which misconduct
can be the sole basis for an unequal division under the
Matrimonial Property Act must be very rare and exceptional
and attempts to use allegations of misconduct as a pretext
for needlessly vilifying the other spouse in court should, I
think, be resisted by deterrent awards of costs.
XI. Evidence and Length of Marriage
In Best, MacGregor and Briggs, 73 Hallett J. emphasized that
the burden of proof is on the party seeking to obtain unequal
division and that the words "unfair" or "unconscionable" in
s. 13 are not easily satisfied. In this he was supported by Glube
C. J. in Wilson v. Wilson.74 Moreover in Briggs v. Briggs
75
Hallett J. emphasized that the words "length of marriage" in
s. 13(d) were more apt to cover short marriages rather than
long ones. (No doubt because of the inclusion of property
owned prior to marriage as matrimonial assets.) A long
marriage was to be presumed and a wife could not expect an
unequal division merely by proving that a marriage had lasted
a number of years.
This is not to say that the 59 year old wife in Bedgood v.
Bedgood76 is not entitled to the security of an order under either
an unequal division under s. 13 or to lump sum maintenance
under the Divorce Act. As the Court of Appeal explained in
Bedgood there is some overlap between the two provisions,
though s. 13 has certain advantages. There is no need to provide
evidence of need and s. 13 has more specific criteria likely to
accommodate the wife's particular case including s. 13(i):
the contribution made by each spouse to the marriage and
to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made
as a homemaker or parent.
73. Id.
74. 66 N.S.R. (2d) 361 (T.D.).
75. (1984) 64 N.S.R. (2d) 40 at 43 (T.D.). See also Glube C.J.'s confirmation
of this view in Wilson v. Wilson, supra, at note 74.
76. (1982), 28 R.F.L. (2d) 113 (N.S.S.C., A.D.).
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XII. Costs
In Lawrence v. Lawrence77 Hart J.A. suggested that the time
might have come to treat costs of matrimonial proceedings as
one of the liabilities of matrimonial property and to arrange
any division of matrimonial assets so as to allow each party
to pay equally towards the whole amount of the costs. Rule
67.06 of the Procedure Rules supplements this by allowing
offers to settle and under Rule 67.06(4) & (5) the court can
consider such offers and their rejection in determining the
appropriate costs. It is not, however, clear to what extent in
practice formal offers are being made under Rule 67. Nor is
it clear even when a plaintiff's oral testimony reveals that she
is only asking for a "reasonable or 50%:50% division", when
this position was adopted. It is not unusual for a plaintiff to
adopt a moderate position at the end of trial. In these cases
where it seems likely that for much of the negotiations the wife
was asking for an unequal division of everything and the
husband was trying to depict everything as a business asset,
it may be appropriate to treat the costs as an incident of the
ownership of matrimonial assets and to share them. 78 What
is also clear is that the mere fact that a petitioning wife gets
a divorce and an equal division of matrimonial assets is no
guarantee of her entitlement to costs when her position
throughout has been that she is entitled to an unequal division.
In Best v. Best,79 although the husband's claim that the farm
was a business asset failed the husband won on the question
of costs. His offer in dollar terms (even accepting that the farm
was, as the court eventually held, a matrimonial asset) exceeded
the division ordered by the courts and became relevant to the
award of costs. In DeVenney v. DeVenney80 the court found
that the plaintiff's unnecessary prolongation of the trial by
raising the issue of conduct (which could be proved to be
relevant on the available evidence) also became relevant to
costs. It will be interesting to speculate on how a client's costs
will be taxed if a court holds that a substantial amount of
a client's costs were only incurred as a result of a lawyer
77. (1981), 20 R.F.L. (2d) 414 (N.S.S.C., T.D.).
78. Id.
79. (1984) 61 N.S.R. (2d) 400 (T.D.).
80. supra at note 72.
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mistakenly advising his client that irrelevant issues should be
pursued. In Devenney8 ' the wife's award was more favourable
to her than the pre-trial offers. Costs were fixed in the amount
of $3,000 subject to a set off of the husband's costs on his
counter-petition until the wife's adultery was admitted. Counsel
argued that taxed party and party costs would have been
approximately $2,000 and that an award of 1.5 times the normal
costs would be approximate by analogy with Civil Procedure
Rule 41A (although that rule was not in force at the time of
the offer). Subsequently in Vezina v. Vezina 82 costs were
awarded against the respondent husband because he had not
provided basic financial information, had misled the court with
respect to his absence at the time set for the trial and had
neglected to provide information which would have led to a
more appropriate solution of the matter. An equal division of
matrimonial assets was ordered.
81. A separate decision as to costs. As yet unreported March 25, 1985.
82. Unreported decision of Kelly, J. 201-31932, dated July 16, 1985.
